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Abstract In their comment on Marewski et al. (good
judgments do not require complex cognition, 2009) Evans
and Over (heuristic thinking and human intelligence: a
commentary on Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer,
2009) conjectured that heuristics can often lead to biases
and are not error free. This is a most surprising critique.
The computational models of heuristics we have tested
allow for quantitative predictions of how many errors a
given heuristic will make, and we and others have mea-
sured the amount of error by analysis, computer simulation,
and experiment. This is clear progress over simply giving
heuristics labels, such as availability, that do not allow for
quantitative comparisons of errors. Evans and Over argue
that the reason people rely on heuristics is the accuracy-
effort trade-off. However, the comparison between heu-
ristics and more effortful strategies, such as multiple
regression, has shown that there are many situations in
which a heuristic is more accurate with less effort. Finally,
we do not see how the fast and frugal heuristics program
could beneﬁt from a dual-process framework unless the
dual-process framework is made more precise. Instead,
the dual-process framework could beneﬁt if its two ‘‘black
boxes’’ (Type 1 and Type 2 processes) were substituted
by computational models of both heuristics and other
processes.
Explanation…demands a theory…that predicts effects
of the manipulated variables on performance of each
task. Crude distinctions between ‘‘systems’’ are seldom
sufﬁcient for this purpose. Further, once a sufﬁciently
elaborateprocessmodelisinhand,itisnotclearthatthe
notion of a system is any longer of much use. Once the
model has been spelled out, it makes little difference
whether its components are called systems, modules,
processes, or something else; the explanatory burden
is carried by the nature of the proposed mechanisms
and their interactions, not by what they are called.
(Hintzman 1990,p .1 2 1 )
Evans and Over (2009) provided comments on our
article (Marewski et al. 2009). Here, we respond to their
major points.
Models of heuristics specify the proportion of correct
and false judgments
In their critique of our article, Evans and Over’s (2009) ﬁrst
point is that ‘‘heuristics can often lead to biases as well
as effective responding’’ (p. 2) and that we write ‘‘as if
heuristics were invariably rational and error free’’ (p. 5).
This is a most surprising conjecture.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) correctly argued that
heuristics are in general quite effective but sometimes lead
to severe errors. But since they had no computational
models of availability, representativeness, and anchoring,
they could not spell out the ‘‘sometimes.’’ The fast and
frugal heuristics framework has spelled out the sometimes
by developing computational models of heuristics that
allow for quantitative predictions about how many errors
heuristics make, or how their performance compares to that
of more complex models. Here are three examples.
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when the recognition validity is 0.80 and a person recog-
nizes half of the objects without having any further
knowledge, then by relying on the recognition heuristic,
this person would get it right in 65% of the cases. This
means this person would get it wrong in 35% of the cases.
This is an example of an analytical result about how many
errors the use of a certain heuristic implies given a certain
knowledge state of the person.
Second, across 20 different studies on predicting psy-
chological, demographic, economic, and other criteria,
take-the-best, tallying, multiple regression, and minimalist
made correct predictions, on average, in 71, 69, 68, and
65% of the cases (Czerlinski et al. 1999, p. 105). This
means that, on average, the strategies made errors 29, 31,
32, and 35% of the time, respectively. This is a simulation
result that speciﬁes the proportion of errors heuristics and
the more complex strategy multiple regression make in
prediction.
Third, consider the question faced by managers of how
to tell whether a customer is still active or has become
inactive in a large customer database. Wu ¨bben and Wan-
genheim (2008) reported that managers rely on one-reason
decision making—speciﬁcally, the hiatus heuristic: If
customers have not purchased anything for 9 (in one case,
6) months, conclude that they are inactive, otherwise
active. In three different companies, this heuristic overall
correctly classiﬁed 83, 77, and 77% of the customers,
respectively, compared to a Pareto/NBD (negative bino-
mial distribution) model, a standard optimization technique
in this ﬁeld, which classiﬁed 75, 77, and 74% of the cus-
tomers correctly. This means the heuristic got it wrong in
17, 23, and 23% of the cases, while the optimization model
got it wrong slightly more often. This was an empirical
study that compared actual experts’ heuristics with an
optimization model.
These examples illustrate that heuristics are not error
free, and that formal models allow us to quantify the errors
and compare them to the errors other models make.
Therefore, it is hard to understand how Evans and Over
(2009) can interpret our writing as claiming that heuristics
are error free. By the way, the second and third result
illustrate that it is not so infrequently in the real world that
one-reason decision-making heuristics are faster, more
frugal, and more accurate at the same time. This leads to a
second misunderstanding.
Heuristics do not always imply effort-accuracy
trade-offs
A c c o r d i n gt oE v a n sa n dO v e r( 2009), heuristics are
‘‘short-cut methods of solving problems that pay a cost
in accuracy for what they gain in speed’’ (p. 5). With
this they have repeated the standard account of heu-
ristics, which we and others have shown to be incorrect.
As the examples above illustrate and as we pointed out
throughout our paper (Marewski et al. 2009), heuristics
do not always imply effort-accuracy trade-offs. Com-
puter simulations and experiments have shown that
fast and frugal decision-making strategies can often lead
to more accurate inferences than strategies that use
more information and computation. The analysis of the
situations in which this occurs is part of the study
of ecological rationality (Gigerenzer and Brighton
2009). An organism (or system or organization, etc.)
that is faced with uncertainty sometimes needs to ignore
information to make good decisions, and therefore
simplicity can pay in ways beyond allowing for faster
decisions.
Logic can be easy
Evans and Over’s (2009) second major conjecture is that
‘‘the rules of logic and probability theory can sometimes
be easy to apply’’ (p. 4). Sometimes—no problem. But if
we remember correctly, research on reasoning has also
emphasized that people systematically violate these
rules. Prominent examples include the conjunction fal-
lacy, the Wason selection task, base rate neglect, or the
belief bias research of Jonathan Evans (e.g., Evans
2007).
Toward formal models instead of vague labels
Evans and Over’s (2009) ﬁnal point is that the fast and
frugal heuristics framework ignores research on dual-
process theory, but that ‘‘the role of their fast and frugal
heuristics can only [be] correctly understood within such
a framework’’ (p. 4). We disagree. From our point of
view, the dual-process framework that Evans and Over
refer to is too vague to be useful. In the absence of formal
models, none of the important results in the three initial
examples given in this reply—such as when the recog-
nition heuristic, take-the-best, or tallying lead to less-is-
more effects, or the test of the hiatus heuristic against
optimizing models—could have been derived. Gigerenzer
and Regier (1996) and others (Keren and Schul 2009)
have criticized in detail the jumbling together of various
theories into a loose list of opposing labels. Indeed,
it seems that much of the data and theory on a general
dual-process framework is mired in debates about jargon.
This use of jargon to redescribe jargon is a hallmark of
theoretical stagnation (Kuhn 1962).
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If we are to make scientiﬁc progress, we must move
beyond naming and renaming vague ideas. General verbal
distinctions such as ‘‘rule-based versus instance-based’’ do
not represent progress beyond what was well documented
nearly 40 years ago, in the 1970s, unless these labels can
be substantiated in terms of formal models that precisely
deﬁne what they mean and what they predict. As stressed
by Hintzman (1990), what really matters is the precision
with which psychological models are deﬁned and not how
they are labeled. In contrast to Evans (2008), who proposed
replacing the labels System 1 and System 2 with the terms
Type 1 and Type 2 processes, we therefore suggest that it is
instead the dual-process framework with its two ‘‘black
boxes’’ that should be replaced by computationally precise
formal models. Scientiﬁc progress is not found in the
accumulation of marketable labels. Instead, it requires the
development of precise theories of psychological processes
that lead to clear, testable, quantitative predictions.
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